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Non-­‐technical	  summary	  
	  
Informational	  asymmetries	  abound	  in	  anonymous	  markets,	  such	  as	  those	  opening	  in	  the	  
internet	  almost	  every	  day.	  In	  particular,	  before	  trading	  takes	  place,	  the	  typical	  buyer	  does	  
not	  know	  whether	  her	  anonymous	  counterpart,	  namely	  the	  seller	  she	  is	  confronted	  with,	  
appropriately	  describes	  and	  prices	  the	  trading	  item;	  and	  whether	  he	  conscientiously	  
conducts	  the	  transaction,	  so	  she	  receives	  the	  item	  in	  time	  and	  in	  good	  condition.	  	  
Without	  remedies,	  these	  informational	  asymmetries	  invite	  adverse	  selection	  and	  moral	  
hazard.	  Adverse	  selection	  may	  arise	  because	  conscientious	  sellers	  leave-­‐-­‐-­‐or	  may	  not	  even	  
enter-­‐-­‐-­‐the	  market,	  as	  long	  as	  their	  behavioral	  trait,	  and	  their	  effort,	  are	  ex	  ante	  
unobservable	  to	  the	  buyers,	  and	  thus	  the	  buyers'	  willingness	  to	  pay	  or	  even	  to	  trade	  is	  
hampered.	  For	  complementary	  reasons,	  opportunistically	  exploitative	  and	  careless	  sellers	  
tend	  to	  self-­‐select	  into	  such	  a	  market,	  because	  they	  can	  cheat	  on	  buyers	  by	  incorrectly	  
claiming	  to	  offer	  high	  quality	  products	  and	  good	  delivery	  service	  at	  high	  price.	  Moral	  hazard	  
may	  arise	  because	  effort	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  market	  is	  costly:	  sellers	  may	  package	  goods	  
badly,	  or	  delay,	  or	  default	  on	  delivery.	  Likewise,	  buyers	  may	  delay,	  or	  default	  on	  payments.	  	  
Whereas	  the	  consequences	  of	  adverse	  selection	  and	  moral	  hazard	  are	  well	  understood	  
conceptually,	  we	  still	  lack	  empirical	  tests	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  effects	  as	  predicted	  by	  
theory,	  and	  evidence	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  these	  effects.	  Anonymous	  markets	  such	  as	  those	  
organized	  in	  the	  internet	  provide	  a	  useful	  environment	  for	  collecting	  evidence	  and	  
conducting	  tests.	  	  
Faced	  with	  adverse	  selection	  and	  moral	  hazard	  in	  these	  markets,	  the	  market	  organizers	  
designed	  remedies	  early	  on.	  In	  particular	  they	  constructed	  mechanisms	  under	  which	  buyers	  
and	  sellers	  mutually	  evaluate	  their	  performance;	  and	  documented	  them,	  so	  that	  agents	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  market	  could	  build	  reputation	  capital.	  In	  reaction	  to	  opportunistic	  reporting	  
behavior	  on	  one,	  or	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  market,	  that	  was	  not	  anticipated	  by	  the	  mechanism	  
designers,	  the	  reporting	  mechanisms	  were	  improved	  upon	  over	  time.	  	  
We	  collected	  reporting	  data	  before,	  and	  after	  such	  changes	  to	  address	  a	  question	  we	  feel	  to	  
be	  central	  in	  evaluating	  the	  performance	  of	  anonymous	  markets:	  What	  are	  the	  qualitative	  
and	  quantitative	  effects	  of	  an	  unexpected	  improvement	  in	  the	  typical	  market	  participant's	  
reporting	  possibilities	  about	  her	  counterpart's	  performance?	  	  
We	  show	  that	  this	  leads	  to	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  buyer	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  incumbent	  
sellers.	  The	  effect	  is	  substantively	  and	  significantly	  stronger	  for	  sellers	  that	  had	  performed	  
poorly	  before	  the	  change.	  In	  fact,	  rather	  than	  exiting	  from	  the	  market-­‐-­‐-­‐which	  would	  have	  
been	  the	  alternative	  reaction	  to	  the	  improvement	  in	  the	  reporting	  mechanism-­‐-­‐-­‐,	  the	  sellers	  
rated	  previously	  poorly	  improved	  on	  all	  dimensions	  reported	  on.	  	  
Towards	  our	  preferred	  interpretation	  of	  these	  results,	  we	  developed	  a	  toy	  model	  from	  which	  
we	  predict	  effects	  on	  seller	  adverse	  selection	  and	  moral	  hazard.	  Sellers	  differ	  by	  the	  dis-­‐
utility	  they	  suffer	  from	  engaging	  in	  effort	  towards	  satisfying	  a	  consumer	  at	  a	  given	  
(competitive)	  price.	  Before	  the	  change	  reflected	  within	  this	  toy	  model,	  sellers	  are	  
incentivized	  to	  announce	  low	  quality	  goods	  as	  of	  high	  quality,	  because	  that	  way,	  they	  can	  
fetch	  a	  higher	  price;	  and	  to	  be	  careless	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  good	  –	  and	  still	  can	  expect	  to	  
obtain	  a	  good	  buyer	  rating,	  because	  buyers	  fear	  retaliation	  by	  the	  seller	  to	  any	  negative	  
rating.	  Removing	  that	  fear	  incentivizes	  the	  buyer	  to	  report	  truthfully	  rather	  than	  
opportunistically,	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  report	  on	  negative	  experiences.	  Badly	  rated	  sellers	  
react	  to	  this	  by	  either	  leaving	  the	  market,	  thus	  ameliorating	  adverse	  selection;	  or	  engage	  in	  
more	  effort	  towards	  improving	  on	  buyer	  satisfaction,	  thus	  ameliorating	  moral	  hazard.	  
We	  assess	  in	  detail	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  empirical	  results	  against	  alternative	  interpretations	  
and	  conclude	  that	  our	  interpretation	  fits	  best,	  that	  is:	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  informational	  
asymmetry	  generated	  by	  informational	  bias	  results	  in	  a	  reduction	  of	  seller	  moral	  hazard,	  
rather	  than	  a	  reduction	  of	  adverse	  selection.	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Zusammenfassung	  
	  
Anonyme	  Märkte	  wie	  solche,	  die	  im	  Internet	  tagtäglich	  geöffnet	  werden,	  sind	  
gekennzeichnet	  durch	  asymmetrische	  Information	  zwischen	  den	  Marktteilnehmern.	  
Tatsächlich	  weiß	  die	  Käuferin	  vor	  dem	  Tauschakt	  nicht,	  ob	  der	  Verkäufer	  das	  Gut	  korrekt	  
beschrieben	  hat,	  und	  ob	  er	  nach	  ihrer	  Kaufentscheidung	  die	  Transaktion	  gewissenhaft	  
durchführt.	  
Ohne	  Abhilfe	  lösen	  diese	  Informationsasymmetrien	  Adverse	  Selektion	  und	  Moralisches	  
Risiko	  aus:	  Adverse	  Selektion	  entsteht	  dadurch,	  dass	  gewissenhafte	  Verkäufer	  den	  Markt	  
verlassen	  (oder	  erst	  gar	  nicht	  in	  ihn	  eintreten),	  solange	  ihre	  Gewissenhaftigkeit	  durch	  die	  
Käufer	  mangels	  korrekter	  ex	  ante	  Information	  nicht	  honoriert	  wird.	  Moralisches	  Risiko	  
entsteht	  dadurch,	  dass	  aus	  dem	  gleichen	  Grund	  die	  im	  Markt	  verbleibenden	  Verkäufer	  ihre	  
Anstrengungen	  gering	  halten.	  	  
Die	  Konsequenzen	  von	  Adverser	  Selektion	  und	  Moralischem	  Risiko	  sind	  inzwischen	  
theoretisch	  sorgfältig	  analysiert	  und	  gut	  verstanden.	  Jedoch	  gibt	  es	  bisher	  wenige	  empirische	  
Tests	  zu	  den	  aus	  der	  Theorie	  abgeleiteten	  Hypothesen.	  Internetmärkte	  bieten	  dafür	  eine	  
nützliche	  Umgebung.	  	  	  	  
Aufgrund	  der	  offensichtlichen	  Konsequenzen	  entwickelten	  die	  Designer	  von	  Internet-­‐
Märkten	  schon	  aus	  Eigeninteresse	  frühzeitig	  Instrumente	  zur	  Abwehr	  der	  adversen	  Effekte;	  
vor	  allem	  in	  Form	  von	  Reputationsmechanismen,	  unter	  denen	  Käufer	  und	  Verkäufer	  ihre	  
Performanz	  gegenseitig	  bewerten	  und	  daraus	  Reputationskapital	  entwickeln	  können.	  Diese	  
Mechanismen	  wurden	  im	  Laufe	  der	  Zeit	  verbessert,	  in	  Reaktion	  auf	  opportunistisches	  
Berichtsverhalten	  auf	  beiden	  Marktseiten.	  	  	  
Wir	  sammelten	  Käuferberichte	  vor	  und	  nach	  solchen	  Änderungen	  zur	  Analyse	  der	  
qualitativen	  und	  quantitativen	  Effekte	  von	  Verbesserungen	  im	  Berichtssystem.	  Wir	  zeigen,	  
dass	  diese	  Verbesserungen	  zu	  einer	  signifikanten	  Verbesserung	  der	  Käuferzufriedenheit	  
führen.	  Die	  beobachtete	  Verbesserung	  ist	  besonders	  ausgeprägt	  für	  Verkäufer,	  die	  vor	  der	  
Verbesserung	  nur	  mehr	  eine	  relative	  schlechte	  Reputation	  hatten.	  Statt	  den	  Markt	  zu	  
verlassen,	  was	  eine	  naheliegende	  alternative	  Reaktion	  auf	  die	  Verbesserung	  des	  
Berichtssystems	  gewesen	  wäre,	  zeigen	  die	  Ergebnisse	  eine	  signifikante	  Verbesserung	  ihres	  
Verhaltens	  aus	  Sicht	  der	  Käufer,	  und	  zwar	  in	  allen	  bewerteten	  Dimensionen.	  	  	  	  
Zur	  Entwicklung	  der	  von	  uns	  präferierten	  Interpretation	  entwickelten	  wir	  ein	  kleines	  Modell	  
und	  leiteten	  daraus	  Vorhersagen	  betreffend	  Veränderungen	  bezüglich	  adverser	  Selektion	  
und	  moralischem	  Risiko	  ab,	  die	  wir	  aus	  der	  beobachteten	  Veränderung	  im	  Berichtssystem	  
erwarten.	  Vor	  der	  Änderung	  haben	  die	  Verkäufer	  den	  Anreiz,	  ein	  schlechtes	  Angebot	  als	  gut	  
beschreiben,	  um	  damit	  höhere	  Preise	  zu	  erzielen,	  sowie	  Kosten	  einzusparen	  beim	  Vollzug	  
der	  Transaktion.	  Der	  Anreiz	  liegt	  darin,	  dass	  die	  Käufer	  den	  Verkäufer	  dennoch	  gut	  
bewerten,	  aus	  Furcht	  vor	  einer	  negativen	  Reaktion	  der	  Verkäufer	  auf	  ihre	  kritische	  
Bewertung.	  Werden	  nun	  Käuferbefürchtungen	  über	  adverse	  Reaktionen	  der	  Verkäufer	  auf	  
eine	  wahrheitsgemäß	  schlechte	  Bewertung	  von	  deren	  Verhalten	  beseitigt,	  dann	  werden	  die	  
Käufer	  wahrheitsgemäß	  bewerten	  und	  die	  Verkäufer	  schlechtere	  Bewertungen	  als	  vor	  der	  
Änderung	  erhalten.	  Diese	  reagieren	  darauf,	  indem	  sie	  entweder	  den	  Markt	  verlassen,	  oder	  
sich	  anstrengen,	  um	  durch	  die	  Käufer	  verbesserte	  Bewertungen	  zu	  erhalten.	  	  
Wir	  bewerten	  im	  Detail	  die	  Robustheit	  unseres	  Erklärungsansatzes	  gegen	  alternative	  
Erklärungen	  und	  folgern,	  dass	  unsere	  Interpretation	  die	  empirischen	  Ergebnisse	  am	  besten	  
erklärt,	  nämlich	  dass	  die	  Reduktion	  der	  Informationsasymmetrie,	  die	  ursprünglich	  durch	  
Informationsverzerrungen	  induziert	  war,	  eine	  signifikante	  Reduktion	  im	  von	  den	  Verkäufern	  
ausgeübten	  Moralischen	  Risiko,	  jedoch	  keine	  Reduktion	  in	  der	  Adversen	  Selektion	  der	  
Verkäufer	  nach	  sich	  zieht.	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1 Introduction
Informational asymmetries abound in anonymous markets, such as those opening in the internet
almost every day. Before trading takes place, the typical buyer does not know whether her
anonymous counterpart, the seller she is confronted with, appropriately describes and prices the
trading item, and whether he consciensciously conducts the transaction, so she receives the item
in time and in good condition. In turn, when the good is traded anonymously, the typical seller
does most often not know the buyer’s payment morale.
Without remedies, these informational asymmetries invite adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. Adverse selection may arise along Akerlof’s (1970) classical argument. Conscientious sellers
leave—or may not even enter—the market, as long as their behavioral trait, and their effort, are
ex ante unobservable to the buyers, and thus the buyers’ willingness to pay or even to trade is
hampered. For complementary reasons, opportunistically exploitative and careless sellers tend
to self-select into such a market, because they can cheat on buyers by incorrectly claiming to
offer high quality products and good delivery service at high price. Moral hazard may arise
because effort on both sides of the market is costly: therefore, sellers may package goods badly,
or delay, or default on delivery. Likewise, buyers may delay, or default on payments.
Whereas the consequences of adverse selection and moral hazard are well understood con-
ceptually, we still lack empirical tests on the direction of the effects as predicted by theory, and
evidence on the magnitude of these effects. Anonymous markets such as those organized in the
internet provide a useful environment for collecting evidence and conducting tests.
Faced with adverse selection and moral hazard in these anonymous markets, the market
organizers designed remedies early on. In particular they constructed mechanisms under which
buyers and sellers mutually evaluate their performance; and documented them, so that agents
on both sides of the market could build reputation capital. These reporting mechanisms were
adjusted over time in reaction to opportunistic reporting behavior on one, or both sides of the
market, that was not anticipated by their designers. The changes in the reporting mechanism are
typically unexpected by market participants, and thus can be perceived as natural experiments.
We collected reporting data before, and after such changes to address a question we feel to
be central in evaluating the performance of anonymous markets: What are the qualitative and
quantitative effects of an unexpected improvement in the typical market participant’s reporting
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possibilities about her counterpart’s performance? It would be optimal to study the effects on the
basis of data on the agents’ factual behavior in the individual transactions. Yet that behavior
is not documented by the intermediaries, but rather its evaluation by the counterparty, which
needs interpretation. At the same time, it provides more information than is typically available
in traditional offline markets, where data on seller behavior other than assortment and prices
are typically not available.
eBay’s classic reputation mechanism allows buyers and sellers to mutually evaluate their
performance in just completed transactions. In May 2007, eBay added a new, second rating
system, called Detailed Seller Ratings (DSR), that allows buyers to rate seller performance in
detail—but not vice versa. The DSRs are reported as moving averages over the last 12 months,
so unlike under the classic feedback scheme, the buyer’s individual evaluation can no longer be
identified by the seller under the DSR scheme. One year later, in May 2008, eBay also changed
the symmetry between buyer and seller rating in its classic feedback scheme, by forbidding
negative seller rating and with it, removing buyer fear of seller retaliation to a bad rating by the
buyer, that was likely to have had an influence on buyer ratings before the change was enacted.
Lacking documentation about the agents’ behavior in the transaction, which is not recorded
by eBay, we exploit these changes in eBay’s feedback mechanism as follows. Since under the
DSR scheme, the buyer’s evaluation of a particular transaction is no longer identifiable by the
seller, the DSR can now be considered an unbiased reflection of buyers’ satisfaction of that seller.
We use this unbiased measure to identify how buyer satisfaction was affected by the change in
eBay’s classic feedback mechanism one year later.
We show that this second change leads to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with
the incumbent sellers. The effect is substantively and significantly stronger for sellers that had
performed poorly before the change. In fact, rather than exiting from the market—which would
have been the alternative reaction to the change in the reporting mechanism—, the sellers rated
previously poorly improve on all DSR dimensions.
Towards our preferred interpretation of these results, we develop a toy model from which
we predict effects on seller adverse selection and moral hazard. Sellers differ by the dis-utility
they suffer from engaging in effort towards satisfying a consumer at a given (competitive) price.
Within this toy model, removing buyer fear of adverse retaliation by the seller incentivizes
the buyer to report truthfully rather than opportunistically, and in particular to report bad
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experiences. That, in turn, ameliorates adverse selection, by leading seller with high disutility
of effort to exit the market; or ameliorates moral hazard, by leading the remaining sellers to
engage in more effort towards improving on buyer satisfaction.
We assess in detail the robustness of our empirical results against alternative interpretations
and conclude that our interpretation fits best, that is: the reduction of the informational asym-
metry generated by informational bias results in a reduction of seller moral hazard, rather than
a reduction of adverse selection.
Towards detailing procedure and results, we proceed as follows. In the next Section 2, we
report on the literature pertinent to what we do. In Section 3, we describe the eBay Feedback
Mechanism, and in particular the two changes we focus on. Section 4 contains the description
of our data. In Section 5, we present our central results. In the ensuing Section 6 we develop
our toy model, from which we derive our preferred explanation and interpretation of the results.
In Section 7 we assess the robustness of our interpretation and provide additional supportive
results. In particular, we show that the effect of eBay’s introduction of a new way of sorting
listings had, if at all, then only a small short run effect on seller behavior. We conclude with
Section 8.
2 Literature
Adverse selection and moral hazard are related to asymmetric information between two con-
tracting parties.1 Take a car insurance company and an individual insurance taker. Adverse
selection arises if the individual self selects into buying high coverage because she knows to be
an unsafe driver. Moral hazard is present if she pursues lesser accident-preventing effort in the
face of the better coverage, and is therefore more likely to have an accident.
It is difficult to disentangle adverse selection and moral hazard by just observing the incidence
of accidents conditional on coverage. Therefore, authors have first focused on showing that
asymmetric information affects economic outcomes. In general, this is done by relating individual
choices to ex post outcomes (see Chiappori, 2000, for an early review). For example, Chiappori
and Salanié (2000) use data on contracts and accidents in the French market for automobile
insurance to test whether insurance contracts with more comprehensive coverage are chosen by
1Sometimes, a distinction is made between ex ante moral hazard and ex post moral hazard. The terminology
adverse selection refers to the former in this paper, and the terminology moral hazard to the latter.
4
individuals who then have higher claim probabilities. If this is the case, then this can either be
explained by moral hazard, or adverse selection, or both, without further discrimination.2
From the theorist’s point of view, the inability to disentangle adverse selection and moral
hazard effects does not come as surprise: the analyst typically cannot observe self selection ex
ante by type because the type is largely private information. In addition, with an endogenous
change of effort, that type can modify the outcome. In the interpretation of our results preferred
by us, we can strictly separate the two effects ex post, by observing poorly performing sellers’
exit from the market as reflecting a reduction in adverse selection; and ongoing sellers’ effort
taking, as reflecting a reduction in moral hazard.
At any rate, following up on Chiappori and Salanié (2000), Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet
(2003) and Abbring, Heckman, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003) argue that dynamic insurance
data allow researchers to isolate moral hazard effects, by looking at insurance contracts in which
the financial loss associated with a second claim in a year is bigger, so that exercising moral
hazard becomes more costly, and therefore the incentive to do so decreases. One can isolate
moral hazard effects in this context because one naturally follows an individual over time, and
therefore the factors influencing adverse selection stay the same, while incentives to exert moral
hazard change. In the context of deductibles in health insurance Aron-Dine, Einav, Finkelstein,
and Cullen (2012) follow-up on this idea and investigate whether individuals exhibit forward
looking behavior, and reject the hypothesis of myopic behavior.
Focusing on adverse selection, Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf, and Cullen (2011) show
that some individuals select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral
response to the insurance contract, and term it “selection on moral hazard”. For this, they
exploit variation in the health insurance options, choices and subsequent medical utilization
across different groups of workers at different points in time. Also Bajari, Hong, and Khwaja
(2006) study individual selection of insurance contracts. They provide, as we do in our very
different context, evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection. Their result is based
on a structural model of demand for health insurance, in which, in order to isolate selectivity
ex ante and lacking exogenous variation, they need to control in an elaborate way for individual
risk and risk preference.
2See also Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) for a similar approach in the context of annuitization and mortality
and Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2006) in the context of health insurance.
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We instead develop our results from a natural experiment, involving, in our interpretation,
self selection and adjustment of moral hazard ex post. We follow sellers over time, which allows
us to control for unobserved differences across sellers by means of fixed effects when studying
moral hazard. We then study whether an improvement of the mechanism led to increased exit
from the market on the one hand, and a reduction of moral hazard on the other hand.
This paper is more generally related to Avery, Resnick, and Zeckhauser’s (1999) somewhat
sweeping general hypothesis that the internet has greatly reduced the cost of distributing infor-
mation and that there is an efficient provision of evaluations by users. See also Dranove and
Jin (2010), Bajari and Hortascsu (2004) and Cabral (2012) for reviews of the theoretical and
empirical literature on quality disclosure on the internet.
For eBay, the general finding is that better ratings benefit sellers by an increase in the
probability to sell a product, and in its selling price. See, e.g., Melnik and Alm (2002), Lucking-
Reiley and Reeves (2007) and Jin and Kato (2008) for evidence using field data, and Resnick,
Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2006) for experimental evidence.3
These results show that ratings on eBay convey information, but it is unclear how much.
The reason is that, due to the design of the reputation mechanism, ratings were biased before
the implementation of DSR, and the removal of symmetric classic feedback. Resnick and Zeck-
hauser (2002) provide reduced-form evidence that points towards underreporting of negative
experiences and Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, and Stahl (2006) complement this by showing that
the probability to leave a negative rating increases substantially towards the end of the period
in which feedback can be left.
Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, and Stahl (2009) provide detailed information on the actual
structure of the feedback mechanism and provide first descriptive evidence on the newly in-
troduced DSRs. Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels (forthcoming) also provide such evidence and
complement it with an experimental study. Focusing on why classic ratings are left at all, Del-
larocas and Wood (2008) estimate a model of rating behavior, assuming that ratings, once given,
are truthful, and estimate the true underlying distribution of satisfaction. This can be seen as
controlling for the selection bias that comes from traders being much more likely to leave a
rating when satisfied.
3In a different context, Anderson and Magruder (2012) relate online ratings of restaurants to restaurant
reservation availability and find that an extra half-star on the popular platform Yelp.com causes restaurants to
sell out 19 percentage points more frequently.
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Cabral and Hortascsu (2010) provide indirect evidence for the presence of moral hazard on
eBay. They find that, when a seller first receives negative feedback, his sales rate drops and
he is more likely to receive negative feedback and to exit. Moreover, they find that just before
exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average. With our paper we
complement the aforementioned studies by providing direct evidence on one of the most policy-
relevant questions, namely the relationship between the design of the feedback mechanism and
the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection.
3 eBay’s Feedback Mechanism
eBay’s feedback mechanism by which sellers and buyers could evaluate the performance of their
trading partners was introduced in February 1996, just a few months after the first auction had
taken place on its website.4 In its earliest form, the system allowed any eBay user to leave
feedback on the performance of any other user, i.e., a “positive,” “neutral,” or “negative” rating
accompanied by a textual comment. This feedback was immediately observable on his or her
“Feedback Profile” page, together with all ratings and comments that a user had ever received
by other users.
In February 2000, four years after its institution, the mechanism was changed to transaction-
specific feedback. Since then, all new ratings must relate to a particular transaction, i.e. only the
seller and the buyer in a particular transaction can rate each other regarding their performance
in that transaction.
From early on, the feedback mechanism has led to conflicts and heated discussions about
unfairly biased reporting. As a consequence, eBay repeatedly modified the system. The two
major changes we focus on here were made in May 2007 and May 2008, respectively. In May
2007, eBay introduced a new form of unilateral rating by buyers: Detailed Seller Ratings (DSR).
In addition to the original bilateral rating available heretofore, buyers could now separately rate
the transaction items accuracy of the item description, communication, shipping speed, and
shipping charges with one to five stars. These detailed ratings are left anonymously and only
unilaterally by the buyer; they are anonymized by being published in summarized form only, so
that the individual rating cannot be identified by the seller.
4An early description of the basic mechanism and an analysis of rating behavior are given in Resnick and
Zeckhauser (2002).
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Figure 1: Changes to the feedback mechanism
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This change tackles what was felt to be a substantial flaw in eBay’s original bilateral feedback
mechanism, namely the buyer’s fear of retaliation when leaving a negative rating before the
seller—a problem well known to many eBay users and well discussed among scholars for some
time.5 An important detail is that DSRs can only be left when a classic rating is left. The two
ratings need not be consistent, however. That is, for the very same transaction, a buyer could
leave a positive classic rating identifiable by the seller—and a negative, truthful set of DSRs not
identifiable by him.
In May 2008, the classic bilateral feedback mechanism was transformed to effectively a
unilateral one as well: sellers could only leave positive ratings on buyers—or none at all. Thereby,
eBay removed the possibility that the seller would strategically postpone his rating, in order
to implicitly of explicitly threaten the buyer with retaliation to a negative rating.6 The two
changes are summarized in Figure 1.7
Since buyers can leave DSR without threat of retaliatory feedback by the seller, we take it
that a buyer’s DSR constitutes a possibly subjective, but strategically unbiased evaluation of
seller performance.8 We use this as the basis for investigating how individual seller performance
reacts to the May 2008 change, when all ratings were effectively made unilateral. As the May
5Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, and Stahl (2006) gave an early account of this.
6In fact, eBay stated the reasons for this step in a public announcement in January 2008: Today, the biggest
issue with the system is that buyers are more afraid than ever to leave honest, accurate feedback because of the
threat of retaliation. In fact, when buyers have a bad experience on eBay, the final straw for many of them is
getting a negative feedback, especially of a retaliatory nature...Now, we realize that feedback has been a two-way
street, but our data shows a disturbing trend, which is that sellers leave retaliatory feedback eight times more
frequently than buyers do. . . and this figure is up dramatically from only a few years ago. So we have to put a
stop to this and put trust back into the system...here’s the biggest change, starting in May: Sellers may only leave
positive feedback for buyers (at the seller’s option). (Taken from http://announcements.ebay.com/2008/01/a-
message-from-bill-cobb-new-pricing-and-other-news/, last accessed in June 2013.)
7Additional changes aiming at alleviating sellers’ concerns about strategic feedback extortion by the buyers but
not of interest in this study were at several points in time. For instance, buyers could threaten to leave a negative
rating if not given a discount, without any fear of retaliation by the seller. To remedy this, eBay abandoned any
options to mutually withdraw feedback. Another change was the introduction of a new way of sorting auction
listings. We discuss the latter change in more detail in the form of a robustness check in Section 7.3.
8As eBay does not follow up the transactions process, there was no unbiased information about eBay transac-
tions available at all before the DSR mechanism was implemented.
8
2008 change enacted by eBay addresses the classic feedback system that was actually better
established amongst users than DSR, we do expect a significant impact of that second change,
even though the May 2007 change to DSR already had made room for candid ratings that could
have affected seller behavior.
4 Data
Our data are monthly information on feedback received for about 15,000 eBay users over a
period of three years, between July 2006 and July 2009. The data were collected from eBay’s
U.S. website using automated download routines and scripts to parse the retrieved web pages
for the details in focus. In May 2007, we drew a random sample of, respectively, 3,000 users who
offered an item in one of five different categories. The categories were (1) Laptops & Notebooks,
(2) Apple iPods & Other MP3 Players, (3) Model Railroads & Trains, (4) Trading Cards, and
(5) Food & Wine.9 We chose these categories because they were popular enough to provide us
with a large list of active sellers, and because they appeared reasonably heterogeneous to us not
only across categories, but also within categories as none of them was dominated by the listings
of a few sellers. From June 1st, 2007 onwards we downloaded these users’ “Feedback Profile”
pages on 18 occasions, always on the first day of the month. The last data collection took place
on July 1st, 2009. The information dating back from May 2007 to July 2006 was inferred from
the data drawn in June, 2007.10
Towards capturing changes in adverse selection, we needed to specify seller exits in the
observation period. We identified as the date of exit the date after which a user did not receive
any new DSRs during our observation window. This is a proxy, as it may also apply to users not
completing any transaction for a period of time beyond our observation window, but being active
thereafter. However, when we follow individuals who become inactive in the very beginning of
our sampling period, then we see that it is very unlikely that such users will become active again
within a couple of months.11,12
9See Table 5 in Appendix A for the exact categories.
10See Figure 8 in Appendix A for a graphical representation of the times at which we collected data. This data
collection design implied that we were unable to recover seller entry in the relevant time interval.
11We are more likely to mis-classify sellers as inactive towards the very end of our observational period. Yet this
is unlikely to affect our results, because we have collected data for more than a year after the feedback change,
and we mostly use information around the May 2008 change to the system. See also footnote 23.
12We also re-did our analysis using a different definition of exit, namely the time after which a user did not
receive any classic ratings anymore. This criterion captures the activity of users when active as a buyer or a seller,
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Out of the 15,000 user names we drew in May 2007, we were able to download feedback
profiles for 14,937 unique users in our first data collection on June 1st, 2007.13 One year later,
we could still download data for 14,684 users, and two years later for 14,360 users.14
Table 1 gives summary statistics. As described above, the first data collection took place on
June 1, 2007. On that day, the average user in our sample was active on eBay for almost four
years. Proxying user experience by the length of time a user has registered, the most experienced
user in our sample had registered with eBay more than eleven years before we collected our first
data, and the least experienced user just a few days before our observation window opened.
About 2,000 of our users had registered their accounts before the turn of the millennium, and
about 3,000 users only within two years before the May 2008 changes.
On eBay, the feedback score is given by the number of distinct users who have left more
positive classic ratings than negative ones, minus the number of users who have left more negative
ratings than positive ones. At the time the observation window opened, the mean feedback score
of our users was 564, the median score was 88, and 769 users had a feedback score of zero. The
average share of positive feedback users have ever received was 99.09 per cent, which corresponds
well to findings in other studies. The median number of feedbacks received during the year before
that was 43. In the following year, users received roughly as many classic ratings as in the year
before, and also the percentage positive ratings was very similar. On June 1, 2008, statistics for
the DSRs are available for the 4,429 users who received more than 10 DSRs. The reason is that
otherwise, anonymity of the reporting agent would not be guaranteed, as a seller could infer the
rating from the change in the DSR. DSR scores are available for about 15% of the users one
month after their introduction in May 2007, and for about 30% of users one year later. The
DSR score we report on here is the average reported score across the four rating dimensions.
as classic ratings can be received when acting in either role. If users are equally likely to stop being active as a
buyer before and after the change to the classic feedback mechanism then finding an increase in the probability
that became inactive according to this more strict criterion also indicates that adverse selection was affected by
the feedback change. The empirical patterns are very similar for both definitions of exit and therefore we do not
report the results below.
13There were download errors for 11 users and we decided to drop three users from our panel for which eBay
apparently reported wrong statistics. Moreover, there are 48 users in our sample who had listings in two categories
(and therefore are not unique), and two users who had listings in three of our five categories. We dropped the
duplicate observations.
14We devoted a large amount of effort to following users when they changed their user names. Still, we were not
successful in doing so for all users. One reason for this is that after an account is closed, the associated feedback
profile is no longer available, and therefore, we could not find it. Over time, it became more difficult to download
data, as eBay put measures in place that prevented us from downloading enough pages within a short amount of
time.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
percentile
obs. mean 5 25 50 75 95
June 1, 2007
duration membership in years 14,937 3.83 0.09 1.33 3.54 6.12 8.46
feedback score 14,937 563.66 0.00 18.00 88.00 339.00 2099.00
percentage positive classic ratings 14,189a 99.09 97.10 99.70 100.00 100.00 100.00
member is PowerSeller 14,937 0.07 - - - - -
number classic ratings previous 12 months 14,937 273.10 0.00 10.00 43.00 161.00 975.00
percentage positive classic ratings previous 12 months 13,943b 98.95 96.49 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
June 1, 2008
number classic ratings previous 12 months 14,684 282.16 0.00 10.00 45.00 164.00 1042.00
percentage positive classic ratings previous 12 months 13,812c 97.95 93.10 99.53 100.00 100.00 100.00
number DSR previous 12 months 4,429d 378.78 12.00 28.00 78.25 265.50 1378.25
DSR score 4,429 4.71 4.35 4.65 4.75 4.82 4.90
number DRS relative to number classic feedbacks 4,429 0.42 0.10 0.27 0.44 0.59 0.70
June 1, 2009
number classic ratings previous 12 months 14,360 200.45 0.00 2.00 20.00 97.00 761.00
percentage positive classic ratings previous 12 months 11,524e 99.47 98.18 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
number DSR previous 12 months 3,272f 376.41 12.00 26.38 72.00 255.75 1378.00
DSR score 3,272 4.78 4.53 4.73 4.82 4.88 4.95
number DRS relative to number classic feedbacks 3,272 0.46 0.11 0.29 0.48 0.63 0.74
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for our sample of sellers. There are three panels, each one for a
different point in time for which we report summary statistics. These points in time are the first point in time at
which we collected data, as well as one and two years after that. DSRs were introduced in May 2007, so the first
point in time is the beginning of the first month after this. The change in the classic feedback mechanism whose
effect we analyze occurred in May 2008, i.e. in the month prior to the second point in time for which we report
summary statistics. The third point in time is one year after that. The feedback score is the number of users who
have mostly left positive feedback in the classic system, minus the number of users who have mostly left negative
feedback. The PowerSeller status is awarded by eBay if a seller has a particularly high transaction volume and
generally a good track record. DSR is the average DSR, per user, across the four rating dimensions. aCalculated
for those 14,189 users whose feedback score is positive. bCalculated for those 13,943 users who received classic
feedbacks in the previous 12 months. cCalculated for those 13,812 users who received classic feedbacks in the
previous 12 months. This is also inferred from other points in time, hence the number of observations is higher
than it is for other statistics in the same panel. dCalculated for those 4,429 users who received enough DSRs
so that the score was displayed. The statistics in the following two rows are calculated for the same users.
eCalculated for those 11,524 users who received classic feedbacks in the previous 12 months. fCalculated for
those 3,272 users who received enough DSRs so that the score was displayed. The statistics in the following two
rows are calculated for the same users.
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Yet another year later, the picture looks again similar, except for the number of classic ratings
received, which has decreased.
At this point, it is useful to recall the objective of our analysis: it is to study sellers’ reactions
to the May 2008 system change, on the basis of unbiased ratings by their buyers effective with
the introduction of DSR one year before. Users may sometimes act as sellers, and sometimes
as buyers. With our sampling rule, we ensure, however, that they were sellers in one of the five
specified categories in May 2007. Moreover, DSRs can only be received by users when they act
as sellers. Hence, the average DSR score will reflect only how a user behaved in that very role.15
Still, it is also important to keep in mind that we will not be able to observe the reaction of
sellers who receive less than 10 DSRs per year.16 However, looked at it in a different way, we
capture behavior that is associated with most of the transactions on eBay, as those sellers who
receive less than 10 DSRs per year are not involved in most of the sales on eBay.
5 Results
5.1 Incumbent sellers’ reactions
The May 2008 change provided additional means to buyers to voice negative experiences without
fear of negative seller reaction. This should have incentivized continuing sellers to prevent
negative buyer ratings by significantly reducing shirking, i.e. not describing and pricing goods
as of higher than the true quality; and increasing their effort in the other dimensions towards
satisfying buyers. Therefore, we expect a significant increase in buyer satisfaction, as measured
by the DSR scores.
This expectation is verified in Figure 2 in which we summarize the evolution of DSRs in
the relevant two 12-month intervals before and after the May 2008 change. Recall that at any
15One may still wonder how often the users in our sample acted as buyers. On June 20th, 2008, eBay reveals
in a statement that buyers leave DSR 76% of the time when leaving “classic” feedback. In our data collection
just before this statement, the mean overall “DSR to classic” ratio of users for whom a DSR is displayed is about
43%. The difference between those 76%, where users acted as sellers, and the 43%, where they acted as buyers or
sellers comes about because they may also have acted as buyers. Looked at it in a different way, the 43% in our
sample is a lower bound on the probability that a user has acted as a seller in a given transaction, because DSRs
can only be left when a classic rating is left at the same time. It is a rather conservative lower bound because it
assumes that a user receives a DSR every time he acts as a seller and it takes a bit more effort for the buyer to
leave a DSR, as compared to leaving only a classic rating. In any case, DSR scores reflect how users have behaved
when acting in their role as sellers.
16Throughout, we will control for seller fixed effects. This is important because sellers for whom DSRs are
available may be different from those for whom DSRs are not available; and because sellers who exit at some
point may be different from those who will not exit. See also the discussion below.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Detailed Seller Ratings
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Notes: The figure shows how DSRs changed over time. The vertical line denotes the time of the May
2008 change to the classic feedback mechanism. The dots are averages across users for whom DSRs
are displayed and the error bars depict corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The circles are linearly
interpolated values for the periods in which we did not collect data. Before averaging DSRs across users
we calculate the average DSR per user, across the four categories. The horizontal dashed lines visualize
that the dots are averages over the 12 months prior to the point in time at which the DSRs are displayed.
point in time, DSR indices are published in four categories, for every seller that has received
more than 10 DSRs up to that point, with ratings aggregated over the respective preceding 12
months. In the figure, each dot reflects the overall average across sellers and categories. The
patterns by category resemble one another closely and are reported in detail in Figure 10 in
Appendix B.
When interpreting Figure 2 it is important to once again keep in mind that DSR scores show
the average of all DSR ratings given in the previous 12 months. Therefore, if all ratings received
after the change were higher, one would observe unchanged ratings reflected in a flat curve
before the change, then an increasing function in the 12 months after the change, and again
a flat curve (at a higher level) after that. The full effect of the change equals the difference
between the DSR rating one year after the change and the DSR rating right before the change,
and is approximately proportional to the slope of the line after the change.
The horizontal lines in Figure 2 depict the relevant average scores that were accumulated at
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the beginning of May 2008 and June 2009, respectively.17 The difference in the horizontal lines
equals the difference between buyer ratings one year after the change, i.e. after the change in
buyer ratings is completely reflected in the 12 months moving average, relative to the score just
before the change. The figure clearly shows that the DSRs have increased after the May 2008
change.18
We performed regressions to quantify the effect controlling for fixed effects. Towards their
specification, denote by DSRit the average score across the four DSR rating dimensions reported
for seller i in period t. Recall that our data is always drawn on the first day of the month, and
that DSRit is the average of all ratings seller i has received over the previous 12 months. Let
wτit be the implicit weight that is put, in the construction of the index, on dsriτ , the average of
all ratings given in month τ . Clearly, this weight is zero for τ < t−12 and τ ≥ t. Otherwise, it
is given by the number of ratings received in τ divided by the total number of ratings received
between period t−12 and t−1. Hence ∑t−1τ=t−12wτi = 1 and
DSRit =
t−1∑
τ=t−12
wτit ·dsriτ . (1)
We want to estimate how dsriτ changed after May 2008. That is, we are interested in
estimating the parameter β in
dsriτ = α+βPOSTiτ +αi+εiτ ,
where POSTiτ takes on the value 1 after the change, and zero otherwise. The change occurred
between the 1st of May and the 1st of June, 2008, and therefore we code POSTiτ = 1 if τ is
equal to July 2008, or later, and POSTiτ = 0.5 if τ is equal to June 2008. This means that we
assume that half of the ratings received in May 2008 correspond to transactions taking place
17The change occurred in mid-May 2008. Hence, the DSR score at the beginning of June, 2008 contains no DSRs
left before the change because it is calculated from the ratings received in the preceding 12 months. Conversely,
the DSR score at the beginning of May, 2008 contains no ratings received after the change. Figure 8 in Appendix
A shows at which points in time data were collected and depicts over which periods, respectively, the DSR scores
were calculated.
18Unfortunately, we were not able to collect data for more than one year after the change, because eBay started
to ask users to manually enter words that were hidden in pictures when more than a small number of pages were
downloaded from their server. Otherwise, we would be able to assess whether the curve indeed flattens out one
year after the change. The remarkable fact, however, is that the scores start increasing rapidly and immediately
after the change.
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after the change.19 αi is an individual fixed effect with mean zero and εiτ is an individual- and
time-specific error term. We cannot estimate β directly by regressing dsriτ on POSTiτ because
dsriτ is not observed. However, by (1), the reported DSR score is the weighted average rating
received in the preceding 12 months, so that
DSRit = α+β
 t−1∑
τ=t−12
wτi ·POSTiτ
+αi+
 t−1∑
τ=t−12
wτi ·εiτ
 .
∑t−1
τ=t−12w
τ
i ·POSTiτ is the fraction of DSRs received after the 2008 change of the system. Hence,
we can estimate α and β by performing a fixed effects regression of the reported DSR score on
a constant term and that fraction. We can control for time trends in a similar way.20
It is important to control for fixed effects in this context because the DSR score is only
observable for a selected sample of sellers, namely those who were involved in enough transactions
so that the the DSR score was displayed. Otherwise, results may be biased; for example because
the DSR score of worse sellers with lower αi’s would be less likely to be observed before the
change because by then they would not have received enough ratings. Thereby, we also control
for seller exit when studying effects on staying sellers’ behavior. Controlling for fixed effects is
akin to following sellers over time and seeing how the DSR score changed, knowing the fraction
of the ratings that were received after the feedback change. This is generally important because
we are interested in the change in the flow of DSRs that is due to the change of the May 2008
change of the feedback mechanism.
Our results will turn out to be robust to controlling for a time trend, however. In light of
Figure 2 this is not surprising, as it already shows that there was no time trend in the reported
DSR scores before May 2008. After that, DSR scores increase slowly over time, but we will show
that this is mainly driven by the fact that DSR scores are averages over DSRs received in the
previous year, and the fraction of DSRs received after May 2008 increased gradually over time.
Consequently, the DSR scores will also only increase gradually, even if the flow of DSRs jumps
19This is conservative in the sense that, if anything, it would bias our results downwards because we would
partly attribute a positive effect to the time prior to the change. Then, we would (slightly) underestimate the
effect of the change. See also the discussion in Section 7.3 and the robustness check in Section 7.4.
20For two separate time trends, the regressors are weighted average times before and after the change. When
we subtract the time of the change from those, respectively, then the coefficient on the indicator for the time after
the change is still the immediate effect of the change. The change in the trend can be seen as part of the effect.
We will also make a distinction between a short-run effect and a long-run effect. For this, the regressors will be
the fraction of ratings received until the end of September 2008, and thereafter.
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Table 2: Effect of the May 2008 change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
full sample small window time trend DSR< 4.75 DSR≥ 4.75
average DSR before change 4.7061*** 4.7030*** 4.7149*** 4.5912*** 4.8138***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0006)
effect of feedback change 0.0581*** 0.0414*** 0.0904*** 0.0316***
(0.0024) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0021)
effect of feedback change until September 2008 0.0169**
(0.0083)
effect of feedback change after September 2008 0.0589***
(0.0184)
linear time trend before change 0.0009**
(0.0004)
linear time trend after change 0.0007
(0.0019)
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.0580 0.0131 0.0603 0.0809 0.0466
number sellers 5,225 4,919 5,225 2,337 2,337
number observations 67,373 30,488 67,373 31,260 33,508
Notes: This table shows the results of regressions of the average DSR score, averaged over the four
categories, on a constant term and the fraction of feedbacks received after May 2008. We assume that
half of the feedbacks in May 2008 were received before the change and the other half after the change.
In specification (2), we do not include observations after October 2008 and before March 2008. In
specification (3) we distinguish between the effect until September 2008 and after that date, and also
account for a piecewise linear time trend. Specification (4) includes only those sellers who had a DSR
score below the median of 4.75 in May 2008 and (5) only those above the median. One observation is a
seller-wave combination. Throughout, we control for fixed effects. The R2 is the within-R2. Standard
errors are cluster-robust at the seller level and significance at the 5 and 1 percent level is indicated by **
and ***, respectively.
up and remains unchanged at a higher level after the change.
Table 2 shows the regression results using DSR scores averaged over the four detailed scores
of all sellers and using all 18 waves of data. We first look at the first three columns and will
discuss the last two below. In specification (1), we use the whole sample and find an effect of
0.0581. In specification (2), we restrict the data set to the time from March 1 to October 1, 2008;
hence there are only 30,488 observations. We do so to estimate the effect locally, because this
allows us to see how much of this global effect is due to an immediate response by sellers. The
estimated effect is equal to 0.0414, which suggests that most of the effect occurs from mid-May
to October 1, 2008. In specification (3), we instead allow for a piecewise linear time trend over
the entire observation window. We find that the time trend before the change is very small and
not significantly different from zero after the change. The effect of the change is estimated to
be a short-run effect of 0.0169, until the end of September 2008, and a bigger effect of 0.0589
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Figure 3: Evolution for two different groups
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Notes: The figure shows how the average DSR score changed over time, with sellers split into those who
had a DSR score above the median of 4.75 prior to the May 2008 change, and those who had a score
below that. The circles and squares are linearly interpolated values for the periods in which we did not
collect data. The error bars depict pointwise 95% confidence intervals.
after that.21
To assess the magnitude of the effect, it is useful to express the numbers in terms of quantiles
of the distribution of DSR scores among sellers prior to the May 2008 change. According to the
results in the first column, the average DSR before the change is 4.7061, and after the change,
it is 4.7061+0.0581 = 4.7642. This corresponds to roughly the 40 and 60 percent quantiles of
the distribution of ratings prior to the change, respectively. Hence, the May 2008 change has
led to a significant and sizable increase in seller effort.
We now look at how this increase is differentiated between sellers with low, and high DSR
before the change. Towards that, we split our sample at the median DSR of 4.75 just before
the change between high and low ranked sellers before the May 2008 change. Figure 3 gives
the picture. The increase in DSR score is stronger for sellers with below-median score ex ante.
21Without the piecewise linear time trend the short run effect is estimated to be equal to 0.0325 and the long
run effect is estimated to be 0.0711, with standard errors 0.0057 and 0.0028, respectively. Then, the magnitude
of the short run effect is comparable to the one of the effect using the smaller sample that is reported in column
(2).
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Furthermore, the difference in the increase between the above-median and the below-median
sellers is significantly different from zero.22 The last two columns of Table 2 report the corre-
sponding estimates, again controlling for seller fixed effects. The difference between the effect
for above- and below-median sellers is significantly different from zero. We obtain similar results
when we perform regressions for those two different groups only for a smaller time window, as in
specification (2), or control for time trends, as in specification (3). In the second part of Table
6 in Appendix B discussed later within robustness checks, we show the effects of the feedback
change by decile of sellers’ DSR rating. Note the decline in the magnitude and significance of
the effect, with increasing decile.
Recall again that the system change was not with respect to DSR, but with respect to
the classic reporting mechanism. The anonymous and unilateral DSR were established one year
before the May 2008 change whose consequences we consider here, and they remained anonymous
and unilateral thereafter. Already with the DSR introduced in May 2007, buyers had been able
to express their true valuation of seller performance without fear of retaliation by that seller. By
looking at the effect of changing the non-anonymous established reporting mechanism, we pick
up only an additional effect. It is remarkable that this effect shows up as clearly as documented
above.
In all, the empirical evidence provides support of our hypothesis that abandoning negative
buyer rating by sellers—and thereby reducing impediments against negative buyer rating—has
led to substantive seller reactions. Buyer ratings—especially of ex ante poorly rated sellers—
improved significantly, which, as we will argue in the ensuing section, results from an improve-
ment in the behavior especially of poorly performing sellers, and with this, a reduction in moral
hazard.
5.2 Seller Exit
Recall that the May 2008 change provided additional means to buyers to voice negative ex-
periences without fear of negative seller reaction. This should also have incentivized sellers
performing poorly before the change to leave the market. To empirically assess this, we looked
22Of concern may be that the increase for the sellers with low DSR before the change may be driven by mean
reversion. Indeed, we have divided sellers based on their score. To check whether mean reversion has to be
accounted for we instead divided sellers according to the median score on August 1, 2007. With this, scores for
the bad sellers also only increase after the change. This shows that mean reversion is not of concern here.
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Figure 4: Exit from the market
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Notes: The bars show the fraction of users that have become inactive in the previous month, among
the 10 percent poorest performing sellers as measured by their DSR rating on May 1, 2008, with the
percentage on the right axis. The dots denote the cumulative fraction of users who have become inactive
since June 1, 2007, with the hazard rate on the left axis.
at the exit rate of the 10 percent worst sellers, as measured by their DSR rating on May 1, 2008.
Figure 4 shows how the hazard rate into inactivity and the fraction of individuals who have
become inactive changed over time.23 We see that overall, many sellers leave over time, both
before and after the change. By June 1, 2009, almost 80% of those sellers have become inactive.
It is interesting to contrast this to the pattern for the 10 percent best sellers, again measured
by their DSR rating on May 1, 2008. For them, we find that only about 45% have become
inactive by that time. This shows on the one hand that eBay is a very dynamic environment,
and suggests on the other hand that better performing sellers are more likely to stay in the
market, as compared to poorly performing sellers.24
The most important finding, however, is that the May 2008 change did not trigger any
significant increase in the exit rate of sellers. We also formally tested whether the hazard rate
23The stronger increase in that fraction towards the end of that window is due to the truncation bias naturally
reflected in our observations, by which we incorrectly sort infrequent sellers into the set of exiting firms towards
the end of the window.
24Recall that we follow a sample of sellers over time, and hence we cannot study entry.
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was different before and after the change. Towards this, we excluded the month of June because
the change occurred Mid-Mai, and tested whether the hazard rate in July and August was equal
to the hazard rate in April and May. The difference between the two is estimated to be 0.003
with a standard error of 0.002, so it is not significantly different from zero. If we focus on the
10 percent worst sellers, as measured by their DSR rating on May 1, 2008, we find that the
difference is estimated to be -.0247 with a standard error of 0.0148, so also for those sellers the
estimated change in the hazard rate is not significantly different from zero.25
6 A Simple Explanatory Paradigm
Figure 5: Sequence of decisions in a typical eBay transaction
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In this section, we develop the explanation of these results preferred by us, and in the ensuing
section, we discuss it against alternative explanations. Our preferred explanation is based on a
toy model involving one stage in an infinitely repeated seller-buyer game. Rather than concen-
trating on auctions that have substantively lost market share in internet markets, our toy model
is based on a fixed price offer by one seller, and one transaction with an interested buyer. The
explanation concentrates on the effects of removing the hold-up on the typical buyer’s evalua-
tion, that before May 2008 was generated in the classic feedback system by the fact that the
seller could retaliate any negative rating by the buyer.
The sequence of decisions in such a typical eBay transaction is condensed in the time line
contained in Figure 5. We focus on a rating sequence involving the seller’s rating of the buyer
after the buyer’s rating of the seller, with the following justification. In Klein, Lambertz,
25We have also checked whether exit rates increased for other groups after the feedback change, but found no
evidence for that.
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Spagnolo, and Stahl (2006), we found that the seller rated his counterpart before the buyer did
so in only 37 per cent of all cases in which the rating was mutual, and that in this sequence, a
positive rating by the seller was followed by a negative buyer rating in less than one per cent,
indicating that the hold up situation we consider to be at the root of the phenomenon analyzed
here is not prevalent in this case.
Assume that the good to be traded can take on one of two qualities, qh and ql with qh > ql,
selected by nature and revealed to the typical seller S at the beginning of the stage game.
Sellers are considered opportunistic neoclassicals: unless punished, the typical seller exploits on
the anonymity in the market, by shirking on the description of the quality of the good to be
traded. Seller are differentiated by their cost of providing effort, in particular in the delivery
of the good. When engaging in high effort, seller type i faces an (opportunity) cost of effort
ci, i ∈ {L,H}, with cL < cH . When engaging in low effort, that effort cost is normalized to zero.
The typical seller is endowed with publicly known reputation capital consisting of two DSRs,
namely accuracy of item description denoted by kd, and quality of shipping denoted by ks, both
taking on values on some closed interval on the positive real line. When deciding to offer the
good at production cost normalized to zero, that seller considers whether to announce it at its
true quality qj and the appropriate price pj , j ∈ {l,h}, which he always does if j = h; or to shirk
if j = l, by announcing the low quality good as of high quality, qh, with an associated high price
ph.
The buyer B, not knowing the true quality of the good, observes the quality-price tuple
announced by the seller denoted by [qˆj , pˆj ], j ∈ {l,h}, as well as the seller’s reputation vector
[kd,ks]. On their basis she forms an expected utility Eu[qˆj , pˆj ,kd,ks], j ∈ {l,h}. Natural as-
sumptions on this utility are that it increases in the first, the third and the fourth argument,
and decreases in the second. She decides to buy the item if Eu[qˆi, pˆi,kd,ks]≥ u˜, where u˜ is her
exogenously specified outside option. In case she decides to buy, seller type i decides whether
to engage in effort ci towards delivery. If providing low effort, seller type i’s pay off is pˆj > 0,
whence if providing high effort, it is pˆj− ci > 0 if j = h no matter i, and > 0 if j = l and i= L,
yet < 0 if j = l and i = H. Hence, if the good is of low quality and announced this way by
the high effort cost seller, his participation constraint in the stage game is violated when he
intends to provide effort. Finally, buyer B receives the good, observes the accuracy of the item
description and the shipping quality, and rates S in terms of these two dimensions. This results
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in a natural upwards, or downwards revision of both, kd and ks, that enters next period as the
seller’s reputation capital.
Before May 2008, the sequence of decisions involving such a transaction was typically con-
cluded by the additional step indicated in Figure 5, in which the seller rated the buyer along
the classic scale, and this rating was publicly observed. We assume that the buyer derives value
from being rated well, e.g. because she intends to use such ratings as reputation capital when
entering as a seller in the future. Decisions are supposed to be taken rationally, that is, with
backward induction in that simple stage game that is repeated infinitely.
Towards results from this toy model, consider first the sequence of decisions before the
May 2008 change. Since the buyer derives value from being rated well, the typical seller S
can opportunistically condition his rating on the buyer’s rating observed by him, by giving a
negative mark if the buyer does so. (Recall in this context that the anonymous DSR cannot be
given without a non-anonymous classical rating.) Retaliation by the seller implies that a buyer
with strong reputational concerns is captive to the seller’s rating, and thus forced to rate S
positively in the classic feedback necessarily preceding the DSR, no matter the seller’s decisions
taken before. In this case, if nature selects ql, the seller, being opportunistic, can shirk with
probability 1 on the buyer, by offering the low quality good at high price ph and by not taking
any effort to deliver the good—yet still receive a positive contribution to his reputation capital.
By contrast, with eBay’s change in the rating mechanism effective May 2008, even the buyer
with reputational concerns can give an unbiased negative rating without fearing retaliation.
There is abundant evidence that a seller, who intends to stay in the market, must be very
concerned with his reputation because he can sell more rapidly, and at higher price. The May
2008 change then implies that such a seller must accurately describe the item even if of low
quality and quote an appropriately low price. Towards obtaining a positive mark by the buyer
that does not negatively influence his reputation capital, he must also take effort in delivering
the item. With the assumptions made above, this implies a stage payoff pl−cH < 0 for the high
effort cost seller.
Consider now the special case of a seller who is endowed with low reputation capital before
the May 2008 change. He faces two alternatives: either to exit the market—but before then
profitably depleting his reputation capital, by shirking, i.e. selling the low quality good at
high price and by not providing costly effort towards delivery, resulting in payoff ph > 0; or
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alternatively to forego that short run rent and to continue operating in the market —but then
to provide goods in a way that his reputation capital increases very strongly even if his stage
pay off is negative, because this allows him to to sell high quality goods at high price later on.
In all, on the basis of this toy model, the May 2008 change results in two main effects:
first, a reduction in moral hazard exercised by sellers who intend to stay in the market; and
second, a reduction in adverse selection exercised by the exit of poorly rated sellers. Moral
hazard is reduced via an increasingly accurate item description and increased delivery effort
of the sellers remaining in the market and results in an improved buyer evaluation; adverse
selection is improved via an increase in the exit rate of sellers poorly rated before the May 2008
change. Alternatively, if the poorly rated sellers continue to stay in the market, we should see
an above average contribution to the reduction in moral hazard, towards an improvement in
their reputation capital.26
Rather than observing both effects, we only observe a significant improvement in buyer
ratings, which we interpret as a factual improvement of seller behavior; and do not observe any
increase in the exit rate of poorly rated sellers—yet a particularly strong increase in their ratings
after the May 2008 change. Why does the poorly performing sellers’ reaction to the May 2008
change appear to be so asymmetric, against exit, and for improved performance in place? Along
the lines of our toy model, the share of high opportunity cost sellers appears to be small, so
improving on the performance—as reflected in buyer evaluations—is still profitable for sellers
in the long run, even if nature selects a low quality/low price item for them. Clearly, giving
up on shirking, by correctly describing and selling a low quality good at low price, involves the
opportunity cost of foregoing a possibly large rent of selling that good at a high price. Yet that
rent must be held against the depletion of the reputation record.
7 Checking for Competing Explanations and Robustness
In Section 5, we have shown that removing negative seller ratings of buyers, and with it potential
retaliation to negative buyer ratings in eBay’s classic feedback system has resulted in a significant
improvement in buyer ratings, especially for sellers that previously were rated poorly; and no
26As to detail, if buyers’ feedbacks are delayed, then we predict from this simple paradigm a downward jump in
the feedback score right after the May 2008 change, resulting from the fact that before that change, sellers exercised
moral hazard in transactions rated negatively by the buyers right after the change, whereas in transactions after
the change, sellers would strategically anticipate unbiased buyer rating.
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change in sellers’ exit behavior, especially that of the poorly rated ones. In the previous Section
6, we gave an explanation that is consistent with these results. In this section we ask whether
our explanation is based on unfounded assumptions, and whether our results could have been
generated from other causes. We finally discuss the robustness of our assumptions on the timing
of the change, and on delays between transaction and rating.
Returning to the first aspect, our explanation is based on the assumption that the DSRs
indicate the true value of the transaction. We have no way of a direct proof of this because eBay,
as a pure intermediary, does not record any data on the transaction. Yet we do have additional
evidence supporting our assumption. In the following subsection 7.1, we show that, in line with
standard predictions on end game behavior, the ratings on sellers prior to exiting the market
degenerate significantly, relative to those on continuing sellers. As buyers cannot predict the
exit of those sellers, we see this as a clear indication of a good correspondence between buyer
rating and the transaction itself.
One also might want to ask whether the self selection derived from our toy model is imposed.
Indeed, self selection can only arise if seller types generically differ, which prima facie seems not
to be the case when looking at the data. Recall, however, that we have included two parameters
in the specification of our key regression, namely a seller fixed effect αi and a seller time variant
effect εit. The fraction of the variance of αi+εit, at a given point in time and across sellers, that
is due to variation in αi gives us an indication of the relative strength of the seller fixed effect.27
In the five specifications reported in table 2, this fraction (x100) amounts to 84, 94, 84, 77 and
54 per cent, respectively. Only the last fraction is low. But that reports on the above-median
sellers. In all, this demonstrates that most of the heterogeneity across sellers is time-invariant.
As to alternative causes, the results could have been generated by a change in the buyers’
rating behavior (buyers could become less critical in rating sellers), or by a change in the
stratum of buyers filing a report (for reasons not known to us). As our data are anonymous,
we again cannot directly exclude these two causes. Yet we again can report on a strong indirect
indication, on the basis of classic feedbacks. Unlike in the DSR, the seller can identify, in the
classic feedback system, the feedback given by a particular buyer on a particular transaction—
but cannot retaliate a negative buyer feedback after the May 2008 change. Since there is a delay
between transaction and rating, transactions taking place right before the May 2008 change
27We calculate it in the usual way after performing fixed effects estimation.
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must have been rated right after the change. If buyers react as we expect them to react, then
there should be a decrease in the classic rating right after the change, thereafter (more than)
compensated by improved seller behavior after the change. In subsection 7.2 we document
exactly this.
In principle, the effects we report on could also have been generated from other measures
taken by eBay in the observation window. In fact, three months before the May 2008 change,
eBay introduced a what is called “Best Match” scheme, under which poorly rated sellers were
positioned later in the rank order in which eBay presents offers on a particular item. In subsection
7.3, we show that it is unlikely that this scheme has caused the reported results.
Finally, in subsection 7.4 we check whether changes in our assumptions on the timing of the
change and on the timing of ratings relative to transactions affect our results, and show that
they remain unchanged.
7.1 Behavior prior to Exit
In an anonymous market such as the one under discussion, we expect rational agents to change
their behavior just before leaving the market. In particular, we expect them to exert more moral
hazard. In view of this, we consider it as an indication supporting our claim that buyers correctly
value the transaction via the DSR if we see buyer ratings on exiting sellers to degenerate.
In Figure 6, we compare the continuing and the exiting sellers’ DSR scores, relative to those
obtained three months earlier. Whereas the relative DSR scores of the continuing sellers remain
essentially unchanged in the time window considered, the exiting sellers’ DSR relative scores
go down on average. The error bars seem to suggest that this difference is not significantly
different from zero. As before, however, the confidence intervals are point-wise. The ratio is
significantly different between those individuals exiting and those staying when we pool over
the time periods. The corresponding regression with standard errors clustered at the seller level
shows that the point estimate of the intercept, which is the average over the dots for the stayers
in the figure is 1.001, with a standard error of 0.0001. Towards appreciating this interpretation,
keep in mind that exits concentrate on the poorest sellers, and that we report here on the relative
degeneration of their DSR scores. This suggests the causality indicated above that DSRs decline
because sellers plan to exit. We cannot exclude the opposite argument, that sellers exit because
DSRs are declining. Yet it would not violate our claim that DSRs are reasonable measure of
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Figure 6: Behavior prior to inactivity
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Notes: In this figure we compare the ratio between the DSR and the DSR three months before for exiting
users (depicted by the squares) to that of the stayers (depicted by the dots). We used linear interpolation
in case we did not collect data for the latter DSR score when calculating the ratio. Circles and squares
are linearly interpolated values for the periods in which we did not collect data. The error bars depict
pointwise 95% confidence intervals.
seller performance if that would be the correct causality.
More importantly, the coefficient on an indicator for becoming inactive is -0.005 with a
standard error of 0.0008. This means that the ratio is significantly lower for individuals who
retire from the market, indicating that performance trends downwards before retirement. The
standard deviation of the ratio in a given wave, e.g. May 2008, is 0.0077, so the effect is equal
to 65% of this, which arguably is non-negligible. In all, this reinforces the results derived by
Cabral and Hortascsu (2010) we have referred to in the literature section 2.28
7.2 Effect on Classic Ratings
Recall that the classic feedback given to a specific transaction was (and is) identifiable by
the seller (and the observer). Recall also that our analysis so far was concentrating on the
28One might wonder the strong attenuation in the effect after May 2008 on buyers turning inactive. One should
be careful, however, in the interpretation for the effect in the first two months reported in the Figure (the following
months indicate imputed averages), as they suffer from a leftward truncation bias.
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Figure 7: Effect on classic feedbacks
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Notes: The left figure shows how the percentage positive feedbacks changed over time. The lines are
fitted values of local quadratic regressions and the shaded area shows pointwise asymptotic 95 percent
confidence intervals, respectively. We used the Epanetchnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 200. The dots
are averages per wave. The solid vertical line depicts the change to the classic feedback mechanism.
The left figure is for those eBay users who were foremost sellers, and the right figure for those who were
foremost buyers. To classify users, we used the ratio between DSR and classic feedbacks received on May
1, 2008. In particular, we classify those 25% users with the highest ratio as foremost sellers and the 25%
with the lowest ratio as foremost buyers.
subsample of the users with enough transactions as sellers so they obtained DSR records. Here
we look at the effect of the May 2008 change on the classic feedback ratings received by all users
sampled, buyers and sellers. Towards conducting the analysis separately for these two groups,
we first classify all users sampled as being foremost sellers or buyers on eBay. We based our
classification on the ratio between DSR and (cumulative) classic feedbacks received by May 1,
2008. Specifically, we classify those 25% users with the highest ratio as foremost sellers and the
25% with the lowest ratio as foremost buyers.
In Figure 7 we compare the percentage of positive feedbacks obtained for the two subpopu-
lations in the observation window. It shows very clearly that effective May 2008, the percentage
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Table 3: Effect on classic feedbacks
foremost sellers foremost buyers
bandwidth 50 100 200 300 50 100 200 300
local linear -.369 -.542* -.328 -.256 .052 .053 -.002 .030
(.470) (.296) (.227) (.204) (.219) (.177) (.122) (.125)
local quadratic -.490 -.408 -.727*** -.762*** -.085 .098 -.049 -.081
(.638) (.497) (.296) (.349) (.378) (.230) (.187) (.158)
Notes: This table shows estimated effects of the feedback change on the percentage positive classic ratings
received by users who were either foremost sellers or buyers. These were obtained by performing kernel
regressions. We used an Epanetchnikov kernel. The cells contain estimates for local linear and local
quadratic regressions and the respective standard errors in parentheses. Each column corresponds to a
different bandwidth. To classify users, we used the ratio between DSR and classic feedbacks received on
May 1, 2008. In particular, we classify those 25% users with the highest ratio as foremost sellers and
the 25% with the lowest ratio as foremost buyers. This leads to 22,762 observations for the first group
and 26262 for the second group, coming from 1168 and 1169 users, respectively. Bootstrapped standard
errors are cluster-robust at the seller level. Significance at the 10 and 1 percent level is indicated by *
and ***, respectively.
of positive feedbacks dropped for users identified as foremost sellers, but remained unchanged
for those identified as foremost buyers. Our explanation is as follows: Typically there is a de-
lay between any transaction and its evaluation by the buyer. As the May 2008 change was
not anticipated by the sellers, they did, on average, exhibit more shirking and carelessness in
delivery right before, rather than right after the May 2008 change. Effective this very date,
however, buyers could leave negative classic ratings without the risk of retaliation by the seller.
In the left figure, we therefore observe a downward jump in buyer ratings right after the May
2008 change, i.e. before sellers could react to that change. The left figure suggests also that, as
ratings increase, they do react as time goes on.29
Table 3 contains the corresponding formal tests. The four columns on the left contain results
for foremost sellers, and the four columns on the right results for foremost buyers, following our
classification. Each column corresponds to a different bandwidth for the kernel regressions, and
in the rows we show results for a local linear regression and a local quadratic regression. Figure
7 suggests that a bandwidth of 200 together fits the data well when we use a local quadratic
specification. The corresponding estimate for sellers is -.727. It is significant at the 1 percent
level.30 Observe finally that the estimated effect for buyers is never significantly different from
29Keep in mind, however, that some of these ratings could still have been received by those users in their role
as buyers.
30The pointwise confidence interval in Figure 7 would suggest that the effect of the change is not significantly
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zero. In view of the fact that this detail is developed from the full sample (and not only from
the subsample of poor performers); that it completely fits the explanation given within our toy
model; and that no alternative explanation to the one given above is in sight, this result very
strongly supports the explanation we gave to our results in Section 6 as against the stories
introduced at the beginning of this section.
7.3 Best Match
An alternative explanation of our results could be another change in eBay’s allocation mechanism
implemented within our observation window. Three months prior to the change whose effects
are discussed here, eBay changed the order in which listings were displayed when buyers on eBay
searched for an item. Before that, offers were simply ranked by the time remaining until the
offer was closed. Under the new ranking scheme, called “Best Match” (BM), a number of factors
determined which listings appeared first. One of these factors was the DSR score, and therefore
the introduction of BM provided an incentive for sellers to improve their performance.31 The
ranking scheme was modified several times since. The exact way of ranking listings is a trade
secret highly guarded by eBay, as is e.g. Google’s search algorithm. We now assess whether the
introduction of BM could have geared our results.
Feiring (2009, 3rd ed, p.16) reports that within the time window of our analysis, the ranking
induced under the BM scheme affected only the very poorest sellers, namely those for whom
Item as Described and Communication, Shipping Time, or Shipping and Handling Charges were
ranked only 1 or 2 (out of 5) stars in more than 3 per cent, and more than 4 per cent of their
transactions, respectively. We concentrate our robustness check on these. We will show first,
that this is a small group of sellers, and second that excluding them from our analysis does leave
our results essentially unaffected.
As the first order effect of introducing BM, we expect the sellers with relatively poor records
different from zero at the 1% level. Any conclusion based on this would be mis-leading, however. The proper test
is based on the estimated size of the jump and the standard error for the that size: the variance of the difference
between the two curves is not the sum of the two variances, but smaller, because the covariance between the two
is positive.
31That change was obviously motivated by the increased attractiveness of the fixed price over the auction format
to sellers: A related reason was, we introduced the fixed price format of listings. They could be 30 days, 60 days, and
90 days. And when you have fixed price listings that can be live on the site for 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, “time end-
ing soonest” which was a sort on eBay, no longer made sense for those types of listings. You have a 30-day listing
that might only come up to the top of the results 30 days after it was listed. So we had this problem, lots of fixed price
inventory, 30 days and 60 days. (Taken from http://files.meetup.com/1537023/Best_Match_Transcript.doc, last
accessed in June 2013.)
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Table 4: Effect of the May 2008 change without 10 percent worst sellers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
full sample small window time trend DSR< 4.75 DSR≥ 4.75
average DSR before change 4.7400*** 4.7426*** 4.7545*** 4.6465*** 4.8129***
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0010) (0.0006)
effect of feedback change 0.0535*** 0.0382*** 0.0844*** 0.0306***
(0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0021)
effect of feedback change until September 2008 0.0016
(0.0074)
effect of feedback change after September 2008 0.0682***
(0.0174)
linear time trend before change 0.0016***
(0.0004)
linear time trend after change -0.0013
(0.0018)
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.0703 0.0165 0.0748 0.1067 0.0437
number sellers 4,047 4,047 4,047 1,794 2,253
number observations 58,004 26,358 58,004 25,390 32,614
Notes: This table is the same as Table 2, except that we exclude the 10 percent worst sellers, as measured
by their DSR score on March 1, 2007.
to realize fewer transactions, and correspondingly obtain significantly fewer DSRs. So we looked
at shifts in the number of DSRs received post March 2008 by percentile of sellers distributed
by DSR scores. Table 6 in Appendix B shows that the number of DSRs received after the
introduction of BM decreased significantly only for the 10 percent poorest sellers (the effect
is -5.76 from a level of 44.44 ratings per month before that, with a standard error of 1.50).
Re-doing the regressions that underly the results in Table 2 and dropping the 10 percent worst
sellers yields Table 4. It is immediate that the results that are very similar, thus supporting our
claim that our analysis is not affected by the introduction of BM.
7.4 Other Robustness checks
We don’t know the exact date of when eBay enacted the change whose effects we are reporting
here. For simplicity of our analysis, we also considered coincident the timing of a transaction
and its rating.32 The effects of moving the date of the change and introducing delays between
transaction and rating are clearly confounding—also with delays in the sellers’ and the buyers’
perceptions of the date of change. In view of the coarseness of our data collection, we will discuss
32Net of the analysis of classic feedback discussed in subsection 7.2 by which we further supported our expla-
nation.
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them within one sensitivity analysis.
Suppose for now that both sellers and buyers would know the exact date of the change
(around May 15, 2008), and the seller changed his behavior in a transaction right after the
change. That transaction was probably completed by May 25 and this was also the time at
which the buyer left a DSR for him. Conversely, if a transaction took place before May 15,
2008, then the seller was not able to react to the feedback change, as it was unanticipated.
Nevertheless, a feedback could have been left for that transaction in the second half of May
2008. So far, we have assumed that half of the DSRs received in May 2008 corresponded to
transactions conducted after the feedback change. Disregarding this reporting delay, we attribute
the ratings after the change all to transactions thereafter, and with this tend to underestimate
the effect of the feedback change. We do not expect this to have big effects, however, because
the delay is likely to be small relative to the length of our observation period.
We don’t have a record on delays between transaction and feedback. Yet Figure 2 in Klein,
Lambertz, Spagnolo, and Stahl (2006) shows the distribution of the time between the end of the
auction and the moment at which the first feedback was left. The vast majority of feedbacks is
positive and for those about 60% are left after 2 weeks and almost 90% are left after 4 weeks.33
Based on this, we re-did the analysis of Section 7.3, assuming that out of all DSRs received
in March 2008, 75% of the transactions took place after the introduction of BM. Moreover, we
assumed that out of all DSRs received in May 2008, 25% of the transactions took place after
the change to the feedback system.
Table 7 in Appendix B shows the results. They are very similar to the ones reported in
Table 2 and 4.
8 Conclusion
In anonymous markets, buyers (and sellers) must rely on reports of each others’ performance
in order to efficiently execute transactions. In this paper, we use changes in the mechanism by
which buyers can report on seller performance, to extract effects, which we interpret as seller
adverse selection and seller moral hazard, and separate between the two.
33For negative feedbacks, the distribution is shifted to the right. Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, and Stahl (2006)
argue that this may be due to strategic considerations: both parties had an incentive to wait with their first
rating if it was negative, because then it was less likely to be retaliated.
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Specifically, in May 2008, eBay changed its established non-anonymous feedback system
from bilateral to essentially unilateral ratings, by allowing sellers to evaluate buyer behavior
only positively, rather than also neutrally or negatively as before. With this, eBay dismissed
with buyer fear of seller strategic retaliation to negative feedback given by buyers which, by
eBay’s own argument, resulted in buyer opportunism when rating sellers.
One year before the change in focus, eBay had introduced unilateral anonymous Detailed
Seller Ratings that already allowed buyers to rate sellers without a bias generated by fear of seller
retaliation to a negative rating—but retained the classic rating that, because non-anonymous,
could be opportunistically biased. We use the unbiased Detailed Seller Rating as the basis for
checking the effect of removing buyer reporting bias via the May 2008 change in the classic
rating mechanism.
We show that this change resulted in improved seller ratings by buyers, but no exit of poorly
rated sellers. In fact, the poorly rated sellers’ ratings improved more than average. Towards
the explanation of these results preferred by us, we develop a toy model that focusses on the
effects of this natural experiment, from which we derive first, a reduction in seller moral hazard
in preparing and executing the transaction; and second, a reduction in seller adverse selection,
as generated by the increased exit of poorly performing sellers from the market. Within this
context, we can interpret the absence of an effect on seller adverse selection by the relatively
low cost of improving on moral hazard.
We check this explanation against a number of competing ones coming to mind, and develop
tests supporting the one given by us.
Our results are derived within the context of an anonymous internet market—a type of
market that obviously increases in importance, and is likely to dominate in transactions volume
classical markets in the foreseeable future. From a business policy point of view, our analysis
provides for a fine example in which relatively small changes in the design of an information
mechanism can have a significant effect. From the point of view of academic research, our
result is, to the best or our knowledge, the first in which the effects of reducing buyer–seller
informational asymmetries on adverse selection and moral hazard are clearly separated and
directly juxtaposed.
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A Further Details on the Data Collection
As described in Section 4, we drew sellers from 5 product categories. They are given in Table 5.
Recall that DSR scores are averages of DSRs received in the previous 12 months. Figure
8 shows the points in time at which we have collected data and the corresponding 12 month
periods the DSR scores are calculated for.
Figure 9 shows how many DSRs and classic feedbacks were received in the preceding year
and over time. The number of DSRs received in the previous 12 months increases until May
2008 because DSRs were only introduced in May 2007. Since then, the number is relatively
stable. The figure shows that on average (across users), more feedbacks are received than DSRs.
The reason for this is that for this figure we have counted DSRs as zero when they were not
displayed and DSRs are only displayed if at least 10 DSRs were left in the previous 12 months.
Table 5: Product categories
Product categories
Home → All Categories → Computers & Networking → Laptops, Notebooks
Home → All Categories → Consumer Electronics → Apple iPod, MP3 Players
Home → All Categories → Toys & Hobbies → Model RR, Trains
Home → All Categories → Collectibles → Trading Cards
Home → All Categories → Home & Garden → Food & Wine
Notes: As of February 2008.
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Figure 8: Data collection
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Notes: The shaded area depicts the time interval DSR scores are covering. The change to the classic
feedback system was implemented during the month of May 2008.
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Figure 9: Number of classic feedbacks and DSRs received in the previous 12 months
0
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0
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0
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0
01jul2007 01jan2008 01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009
classic feedback
DSR
Notes: The blue bars show the average number of classic feedback received in the previous year and the
orange bars show the average number of DSRs received. Both averages are across sellers. The number of
DSRs was counted as zero when less than 10 DSRs were received in the previous 12 months, respectively.
The vertical line depicts the time of the May 2008 change to the classic feedback system. The parts of
the bars that are in lighter color are not directly computed from data but come from linear interpolations
of the original data, before averaging across users.
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B Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 10: Average DSR score by category
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Notes: This figure shows how the different DSRs changed over time. Figure 2 shows how the average of
those four DSRs changed over time and also reports error bars for that average. They are suppressed
here for the sake of clarity. As in the aforementioned figures, the dots are averages across users. Circles
are linearly interpolated values for the periods in which we did not collect data. The vertical line denotes
the time of the May 2008 change to the classic feedback mechanism. The horizontal dashed lines visualize
that the dots are averages over the 12 months prior to the point in time at which the DSRs are displayed.
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Table 7: Effects with time delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
full sample small window time trend DSR< 4.75 DSR≥ 4.75
average DSR before change 4.7067*** 4.7034*** 4.7150*** 4.5919*** 4.8143***
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0035) (0.0010) (0.0006)
effect of feedback change 0.0589*** 0.0435*** 0.0921*** 0.0318***
(0.0024) (0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0021)
effect of feedback change until September 2008 0.0183**
(0.0081)
effect of feedback change after September 2008 0.0652***
(0.0180)
linear time trend before change 0.0009**
(0.0004)
linear time trend after change 0.0001
(0.0019)
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.0583 0.0125 0.0606 0.0820 0.0459
number sellers 5,225 4,919 5,225 2,337 2,337
number observations 67,373 30,488 67,373 31,260 33,508
Notes: This table shows the results of regressions of the average DSR score, averaged over the four
categories, on a constant term and the fraction of feedbacks received after May 2008. We assume that
half of the feedbacks in May 2008 were received before the change and the other half after the change.
In specification (2), we do not include observations after October 2008 and before March 2008. In
specification (3) we distinguish between the effect until September 2008 and after that date, and also
account for a piecewise linear time trend. Specification (4) includes only those sellers who had a DSR
score below the median of 4.75 in May 2008 and (5) only those above the median. One observation is a
seller-wave combination. Throughout, we control for fixed effects. The R2 is the within-R2. Standard
errors are cluster-robust at the seller level and significance at the 5 and 1 percent level is indicated by **
and ***, respectively.
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